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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§
78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(l)-(2), and Rules 49 and 51 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal is taken from an Order of the Utah Court of
Appeals denying Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance's (hereinafter "AMERITEMPS")
Petition for Appeal, which was then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.) Pursuant to the Order of this Court dated March 29, 2006, the only issue before this
Court is whether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413 constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Determining whether a final agency action was entered for
purposes of appellate review directly impacts whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over this appeal and is a question of law, which is reviewed under the 'correctness5 standard.
Housing Authority v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11, 44 P.3d 724. Where the correctness review
requires this Court to consider statutory language, the Court must look at the plain language of
the statute, unless the statute is ambiguous. Id.
PRESERVATION ON APPEAL
On July 22, 2003, the Labor Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order. (R. 495-528). On August 21, 2003, AMERITEMPS filed their Motion for
Review with the Labor Commission. (R. 589-598). On May 3, 2004, the Labor Commission
Appeals Board issued its Order on Motions for Review. (R. 696-704). On May 21, 2004,
Barnard & Burk Constructors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motions for
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Review. (R. 705-709). On June 2, 2004, the Labor Commission Appeals Board filed an Order
Extending Time for Reconsideration. (R. 710-713).
On June 2, 2004, AMERITEMPS filed its appeal of the May 3, 2004 order. (R. 714716). On June 24, 2004, the Labor Commission sent a letter stating that it would take no further
action with respect to the Request for Reconsideration as AMERITEMPS had filed a Notice of
Appeal prior to discovering that a Request for Reconsideration had been filed. (R. 722-723).
On July 20, 2004, the Labor Commission responded that it would go ahead and hear the
Request for Reconsideration. (R. 838-840). The Appeals Board subsequently extended the time
in which to consider the Request for Reconsideration to September 30, 2004. (R. 841). The
deadline was again extended by the Labor Commission to October, 2004. (R. 845-847). The
Labor Commission Board of Appeals issued its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on
October 18, 2004. (R. 848-852).
On November 4, 2004, AMERITEMPS filed its Petition for Judicial Review and Notice
of Appeal. (R. 853-854a). On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals filed its Opinion
affirming the Labor Commission's decision regarding permanent total disability but reserving
the second step proceeding under the statute. AMERITEMPS filed a Petitioner for a Writ of
Certiorari on December 12, 2005. On March 29, 2006, this Court issued its Order granting
AMERITEMPS' Petition for Writ of Certiori.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Mr. Johnny Albert (hereinafter individually referred to as
"ALBERT") filed an Application for Hearing requesting Medical Expenses, Recommended
Medical Care, Temporary Total Compensation, Permanent Partial Compensation, Permanent
Total Compensation, and Other (More surgery, footwear, and pain medication). (R. 98-123A).
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Prior to his filing, however, ALBERT had filed prior Applications for hearing. He had
originally injured his back while working for Transwest Construction and had filed a claim, ,
Claim No. 2002595, seeking workers' compensation benefits as a result thereof.
ALBERT worked for Quality Plating, which was insured by the Workers Compensation
Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Quality"), and on June 18, 1990, ALBERT reinjured his low back while lifting some metal plates. (R. 697). ALBERT received medical
attention and was off work for one week.

(R. 697). He incurred a 2 lA % whole person

impairment rating as a result of his low back injury. (R. 697).
ALBERT was also injured while working for Barnard & Burk, which was insured by
National Union Fire Insurance (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Barnard").

He was

injured on January 21, 1991. (R. 698). The Commission found that ALBERT slipped and fell
on a pipe and injured his low back. (R. 698). ALBERT received medical attention at the time,
but did not miss any work. (R. 698). This low back injury caused an additional 2 lA % whole
person impairment.
ALBERT also filed a claim as a result of an injury that occurred on on July 28, 1991,
when ALBERT injured his right foot while working at American Asbestos Abatement, which
was insured by the Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"American"). (R. 698). The injury caused a 9% whole person impairment rating. (R. 698).
Finally, ALBERT filed a claim for an injury that occurred on June 16, 1997, nine months
after beginning his employment with AMERITEMPS, ALBERT caught his left great toe in a
work-related accident. (R. 698). The injury required four surgeries, over a period of 13 months.
(R. 698). ALBERT did not reach medical stability until February 25, 1999 after which time he
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was returned to regular duty. (R. 698). ALBERT received a 4% whole person impairment rating
as a result of this industrial injury and subsequent surgeries. (R. 698).
AMERITEMPS contends that ALBERT is not permanently and totally disabled as a
result of his 1997 injury and, instead, ALBERT is allegedly permanently and totally disabled, if
at all, as a result of his back condition, right leg condition and a subsequent, non-industrial left
toe injuries, all of which are not related to his work with AMERITEMPS.
Course of Proceedings: On December 17, 2002, at 8:30 a.m., a hearing was held before
the Honorable Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse regarding the compensability of ALBERT'S
injuries and whether he was permanently and totally disabled. (R. 495-528). On July 22, 2003,
the Labor Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. (R. 495528).
On August 21, 2003, AMERITEMPS filed its Motion for Review with the Labor
Commission. (R. 589-598). On May 3, 2004, the Labor Commission Appeals Board issued its
Order on Motions for Review. (R. 696-704). On May 21, 2004, Barnard & Burk Constructors
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motions for Review. (R. 705-709). The Labor
Commission Board of Appeals issued its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on October
18, 2004. (R. 848-852). On November 4, 2004, AMERITEMPS filed its Petition for Judicial
Review and Notice of Appeal. (R. 853-854a). On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of
Appeals filed its Opinion affirming the Labor Commission's decision regarding permanent total
disability but reserving the second step proceeding under the statute. AMERITEMPS filed a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on December 12, 2005. On March 29, 2006, this Court issued its
Order granting AMERITEMPS' Petition for Writ of Certiori.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
ALBERT originally injured his back while working for Transwest Construction in 1986
and subsequently injured his low back while working for Quality. While working with Quality
in 1990, ALBERT was injured in an industrial injury. On June 18, 1990, ALBERT injured his
low back while lifting some metal plates. (R. 697). ALBERT received medical attention and
was off work for one week. (R. 697). He incurred a 2 Vi % whole person impairment rating as a
result of his low back injury. (R. 697). Thereafter, ALBERT submitted no additional medical
records to Quality for payment. (R. 697).
The Labor Commission further found that ALBERT, while working for Barnard, was
injured on January 21, 1991. (R. 698). The Commission found that ALBERT slipped and fell
on a pipe and injured his low back. (R. 698). ALBERT received medical attention at the time,
but did not miss any work. (R. 698). This low back injury caused an additional 2 Vi % whole
person impairment.

In his Application for Hearing, ALBERT claimed additional medical

expenses as a result of this low back injury. (R. 698).
The Commission found that on July 28, 1991, ALBERT injured his right foot while
working at American. (R. 698). The injury caused a 9% whole person impairment rating. (R.
698).

After a lengthy period of recovery, ALBERT returned to the workforce with

AMERITEMPS. (R. 698).
The Commission found that on June 16, 1997, nine months after beginning his
employment with AMERITEMPS, ALBERT caught his left great toe in a work-related accident.
(R. 698). The injury required four surgeries, over a period of 13 months. (R. 698). ALBERT
did not reach medical stability until February 25, 1999, after which he was returned to regular
duty. (R. 698). ALBERT received a 4% whole person impairment rating as a result of this
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industrial injury and subsequent surgeries. (R. 698). The Commission found ALBERT was
unable to work as a result of the accident with AMERITEMPS on June 16, 1997. (R. 698).
The Commission further found that ALBERT'S work-place injuries and resulting
impairments were exacerbated by ALBERT'S low IQ and severe deficits in memory,
concentration, judgment and other mental functions. (R. 698). The Commission also found that
ALBERT also suffered from significant depression, which constituted a 30% whole person
impairment rating. (R. 698). The Commission found that 1/3 of ALBERT'S depression was
attributable to the injuries and chronic pain from his work accidents, leaving 20% whole person
impairment rating attributed to non-industrial factors. (R. 698).
As a result of these findings of fact, the Commission absolved Quality from paying any
further liability for ALBERT'S medical expenses pertaining to his low back injury. (R. 701).
The Commission upheld and adopted the ALJ's other orders and denied the Motions for Review
by Barnard and AMERITEMPS. (R. 701). The ALJ previously ordered that his claims against
Transwest Construction (the 1986 claim), Claim No. 2002595, were dismissed with prejudice.
The ALJ further ordered that ALBERT'S claims against the Uninsured Employer's Fund and
Employers' Reinsurance Fund (Case Nos. 97576, 991213, 991214, 20011071, 20011072,
20011073, and 2002595) were dismissed with prejudice. The ALJ ordered Quality, Case No.
20011070, to pay temporary total disability, to pay permanent partial disability, and dismissed
the ALBERT'S claim for permanent total disability with prejudice.
The ALJ next ordered Barnard to pay permanent partial disability, and to pay all
reasonably related medical expenses of ALBERT with respect to his back, but dismissed
ALBERT'S claims for temporary total compensation and permanent total compensation. The
ALJ ordered that ALBERT'S claims for temporary total, permanent partial, and permanent total
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compensation against American (Case Nos. 97576, 991214, and 20011072) be dismissed with
prejudice.
Finally, the ALJ order AMERITEMPS to pay permanent total disability compensation
from June 16, 1997, until June 16, 2003, for a total amount of $74,880.00 (Case Nos. 991213 and
20011073). AMERITEMPS was further ordered to continue to pay permanent total disability
compensation from June 16, 2003 forward, less fifty percent (50%) of any Social Security
retirement benefits received by ALBERT for the same period. Lastly, AMERITEMPS was
ordered to pay medical expenses for ALBERT'S industrial accident of June 16, 1997, and was
ordered to pay attorney fees in the amount of $10,352 to ALBERT'S attorney.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The only issue before the Utah Supreme Court is whether an initial (tentative) finding of
permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 constitutes a final agency action
for purposes of appellate review. AMERITEMPS posits that because Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413 specifically mandates that an order of the Labor Commission is not final until a second-step
proceeding is noticed up and conducted by the Commission, an order by the Commission is not a
final appealable order until after the second step proceeding is noticed up and the employer
either submits a reemployment plan or waives the second-step proceeding.

The Court of

Appeals already has found that AMERITEMPS did not waive its rights to a second step
proceeding and found the Commission never noticed any of the parties regarding their rights to a
second step proceeding.
AMERITEMPS further posits that the Court of Appeals analysis is the first such decision
to utilize the case of Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT
40, 999 P.2d 17 (articulating factors utilized to determine a final agency action), with respect to

ID

Labor Commission cases in determining whether the Commission has issued a final appealable
order.

The Court of Appeals' analysis with respect to Permanent Total Disability cases,

however, is flawed as the plain language of the § 34A-2-413 specifically mandates when an
order of permanent total disability is a final appealable order. For other cases involving issues
not pertaining to Permanent Total Disability, the Court of Appeals analysis would be appropriate
in determining whether the Commission's various decisions should considered final appealable
decisions for purposes of review.
In the instant case, because the Commission did not follow the explicit language and
procedure detailed in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) with respect to permanent total disability
awards, the Commission's decision was not a final decision and this matter should be remanded
to the Commission to conduct the second-step proceeding mandated by statute as already
determined by the Utah Court of Appeals. When the Labor Commission did not enter an initial
(tentative)fmding of permanent total disability, never notified the parties of their right to submit
a rehabilitation plan, never requested rehabilitation or a rehabilitation plan, and never entered a
final order after said processes were conducted, then the Commission's order could not be a final
order and this matter should be remanded to allow the parties their rights under § 34A-2-413(6).
ARGUMENTS
I.

BECAUSE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF U.C.A. § 34A-2-413(6)
EXPLICITLY STATES WHEN AN ORDER FOR PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY IS FINAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLICATION OF
THE UNION PACIFIC TEST TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WAS IN
ERROR AND THIS COURT MUST FOLLOW THE PLAIN LANGUAGE
OF THE STATUTE WITH RESPECT TO PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY CASES

Because Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 specifically mandates that an order of the Labor
Commission is not final until a second-step proceeding is noticed up and conducted by the
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Commission, the Court of Appeals should have followed the plain language of the statute with
respect to permanent total disability cases. Under the plain language of the statute, an order by
the Commission is not a final appealable order until after the second step proceeding is noticed
up and the employer either submits a reemployment plan or waives the second-step proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a).
The Court of Appeals already has explicitly determined that AMERITEMPS did not
waive its rights to a second step proceeding. Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined that
there was nothing in the record and "nothing in the discussion between the ALJ and counsel for
AMERITEMPS that supports a finding that AMERITEMPS intended to waive its right to submit
a reemployment plan ..." Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, f 13, 128
P.3d 31. The Court of Appeals further found the Commission never provided notice to any of
the parties regarding their rights to a second step proceeding. Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491, If
23 andn. 3.
Based upon the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a), the Court of
Appeals should have remanded this case to the Labor Commission for the second step
proceeding as the Commission's prior order was not a final appealable order. This Court already
has ruled that it "will interpret a statute according to its plain meaning and seek to effectuate the
intent of the legislature." Machock v. Fink, 2006 UT 30, f 16, - P.3d - (citing, State v. Ireland,
2006 UT 17, \ 11, — P.3d —). The plain language of § 413 (6)(a) makes clear that an order of
permanent total disability is not final until notice of a second step is provided, the employer
provides a rehabilitation plan or waives said plan, and the administrative law judge holds a
hearing on said rehabilitation plan.
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Instead of remanding the case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with
the statute, the Court of Appeals applied the test articulated in Union Pacific Railroad Company
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17, to determine whether the preliminary
finding of permanent total disability was a final agency action for purposes of appeal. Its
purpose for doing so was to reconcile "the statutory language with the applicable regulations."
Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491, «([ 24. Specifically, the Court of Appeals was attempting to
reconcile the express language of the Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a) with the language in
the Utah Administrative Code R612-1-10(C)(1)(c). Id.
The Court of Appeals' attempt to reconcile the statute and the regulation was in error,
because "the rules and regulations of an administrative agency must conform to rather than be
contrary and inconsistent with statutory law." McKnight v. State Land Bd., 14 Utah 2d 238, 381
P.2d 726, 730 (Utah 1963); see also, Bradshaw v. Wilkinson Water Co., 2004 UT 38,1j 33, 94
P.3d 242. Under this longstanding rule, if the Labor Commission has passed a rule or regulation
that is contrary and inconsistent with the statutory law, the Labor Commission rule must be read
in light of the statutory law as opposed to harmonizing the statutory law to the regulation. As a
result, the Court of Appeals was in error when it attempted to reconcile the statutory language
with the administrative rules regarding permanent total disability.
If the Court of Appeals had applied the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413(6)(a), it would have been forced to rule that the Commission's order was not a final
appealable action and should have remanded the case to the Labor Commission for further
proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals' analysis is the first such decision to utilize and
apply the Union Pacific factors to Labor Commission cases in determining whether the
Commission has issued a final appealable order.
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The Court of Appeals' analysis with respect to Permanent Total Disability cases,
however, is flawed as the plain language of § 34A-2-413(6)(a) specifically mandates when an
order of permanent total disability is a final appealable order. For other cases involving issues
not pertaining to Permanent Total Disability, the Court of Appeals analysis would be appropriate
in determining whether the Commission's various decisions should be considered final
appealable decisions for purposes of review as those decisions not dealing with permanent total
disability are not regulated specifically by statute.
In the instant case, because the Commission did not follow the explicit language and
procedure detailed in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) with respect to permanent total disability
awards, AMERITEMPS was never afforded the opportunity to submit a rehabilitation plan. By
not providing for the submission of a rehabilitation plan, the Commission not only did not follow
the statute, but also violated AMERITEMPS' due process rights by failing to conduct the second
step hearing.
As previously noted by this Court, "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections." Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, P10, 100
P.3d 1211 {quoting, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
AMERITEMPS was never presented with proper notification of the second step proceeding
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) despite the significant property rights involved with a
permanent total disability case. By failing to provide a second step proceeding pursuant to
§413(6), the Commission failed to protect AMERITEMPS' rights guaranteed by the statute and
by the Utah Constitution in Article I, § 7.
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When the Labor Commission did not enter an initial (tentative) finding of permanent total
disability, never notified the parties of their right to submit a rehabilitation plan, never requested
a rehabilitation plan or a rehabilitation hearing, and never entered a final order after said
processes were conducted, then the Commission's cannot be considered a final agency action for
pen-poses- of appeal1 ancf mfs matter snoufcf be remancfecf to atfow the parties their rights uncfer §
34A-2-413(6) as this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction until such time as the Commission
issues a final order consistent with provisions in § 413(6). See, Housing Authority v. Snyder.
2002 UT 28, H 11, 44 P.3d 724,
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, AMERITEMPS respectfully requests this Court remand this
case to the Labor Commission for proceedings consistent with the plain language of Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-413(6) as the Order previously entered by the Labor Commission was not a final
appealable order.
DATED THIS _ G _ day of June, 2006.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

THEODORE E. KANELL
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants

15

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the Qp

day of June, 2006, a true and correct copy of the

Appellants Brief was mailed first-class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard Burke, Esq.
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP
7390 Creek Road, Suite 104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84093
Attorney for Johnny Albert

Floyd Holm, Esq.
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Allen L. Hennebold, Esq.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Post Office Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600

James R. Black, Esq.
Black & Ingleby
265 East 100 South, Suite 255
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Utah Supreme Court
Attn: Clerk of the Court
450 South State
P.O. Box 140241
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
*\

c

16

ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum is
included herewith.

17

2 of 5 DOCUMENTS
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 38, 2005 UT APP 290 ***
*** JULY 1, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 34A. UTAH LABOR CODE
CHAPTER 2. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
PART 4. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (2005)
§ 34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments -- Rehabilitation

(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to
show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the industrial
accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(li) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic
work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee
from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time
of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim;
and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity: and
(E) residual functional capacity.

Page 2
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413

(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under this chapter and
Chapter 3. Utah Occupational Disease Act. if relevant:
(i) may be presented to the commission;
(ii) is not binding; and
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 662/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than S5% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of S 45 per week, plus $ 5 for a dependent spouse, plus $
5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the
time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36% of
the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial
Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent
total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703.
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial
Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the employer
or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of
50%) of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
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(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(1) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter
8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge:
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the
employee to gainful employment; or
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to:
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection
(6)(a)(ii).
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (6)(a), the administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's subsistence;
and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in Subsection (6)(b) is considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212.
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made under Subsection
(6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act.
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer or its
insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(e)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job placement
services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(in) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The employer's or insurance earner's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the administrative law judge on
the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
. . • ( f ) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative law
judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage provided that employment may
not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
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(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $ 500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $ 500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance earner, a permanently totally disabled
employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained in Subsection
(7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset.
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically appropriate parttime work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been offered but the employee has
failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has
some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if
the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states
specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both
eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final, unless good
cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees
incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination.
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(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability finding,
an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability benefits until the
employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably raises the
issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation benefits, an insurer or selfinsured employer may petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the sole basis
for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's participation
in medically appropriate, part-time work under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing with
other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-I-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees to
an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $ 1,000. The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability compensation benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 116, § 4; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; 1991, ch. 136, § 12;
1992, ch. 53, § 2; 1994, ch. 266, § 2; 1995, ch. 177, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 156; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 375, § 121; 2005, ch. 261, § 1.
NOTES:
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. --Laws 1988, ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last amended by Laws
1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating to permanent total disability, effective July 1, 1988, and enacts the present section.
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, substituted "Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (6)(a)" for "Prior to the finding becoming final" in Subsection (6)(b); added Subsection
(6)(c); and made related and stylistic changes throughout the section.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Commencement of benefits.
Determination of character of disability.
Estoppel.
Evidence.
Final order.
Findings.
injuries.
-- Arm.
— Eye.
- Multiple.
Law in effect.
Maximum benefits.
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Odd-lot doctrine.
Permanent disability.
- Benefits.
Prior accidents contributing to disability.
Proceedings before commission.
Refusal to submit to operation.
Review of plan.
Statute of limitations.
Total disability.
--Question of fact.
Cited.
COMMENCEMENT OF BENEFITS.
ll is within the sound discretion of the commission to determine the commencement date of benefits for total permanent disability so long as the determination is supported by substantial evidence and not patently unreasonable. Oman v.
Industrial Comm'n, 735 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). But see Heaton v. Second
Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990), noted under catchline "Permanent disability — Benefits," below.
DETERMINATION OF CHARACTER OF DISABILITY.
Whether an employee is totally disabled or permanently disabled are ultimate matters to be decided by the commission, as is also amount and time compensation may be awarded upon all the evidence; and upon these ultimate questions
expert witnesses may not properly express opinions, nor may such opinions relating to loss of bodily function become
measure of compensable function possessed by an employee prior to his injury. Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Utah
336, 40 P.2d 188, affd, 87 Utah 358, 48 P.2d 1120 (1935).
Where there had never been a determination by the commission that the injured employee was permanently disabled,
and where he did not have injuries which entitled him to a conclusive presumption of permanent disability, whether or
not he was permanently disabled is a question of fact to be decided by the commission on all the evidence after notice to
and hearing of the parties. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319 (1946).
ESTOPPEL.
Although state insurance fund, the insurance carrier, apparently without any decision of the commission, voluntarily
paid the medical and hospital expenses and $16 per week to applicant for a period of six years from date of accident,
defendant was not estopped from claiming that applicant was not totally and permanently disabled. Crow v. Industrial
Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321, I48A.L.R. 316 (1943).
EVIDENCE.
Commission could not overturn an administrative law judge's decision granting benefits on the sole basis of a vocational evaluation because the report, although admissible in the Commission's proceedings, was hearsay, and a residuum
of other non-hearsay, legally competent evidence was required to support rehabilitation. Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n,
918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. ^App. 1996).
FINAL ORDER.
Because an order to initiate temporary subsistence payments was based on the initial finding, it was not a "final order"
from which an abstract could have been issued. While § § 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 set forth a broad definition of
what constitutes a final order, § 34A-2-413 excepts an initial finding of permanent total disability from the broad definition of "final order" by expressly stating that the initial, tentative finding is not final. (But see Subsection (6)(c), added
in 2005.) Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, 492 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 84 P.3d 1201.
Interim order awarding the claimant permanent total disability was not final and appealable because a reemployment
plan had not been prepared by the employer and considered in accordance with this section. Target Trucking v. Labor
Comm'n, 2005 UTApp 70, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. II, 108 P.3d 128.
FINDINGS.
Finding of commission upon ultimate fact of total and permanent disability, where evidence is conflicting, will not be
disturbed on appeal. Commission is not bound by opinions of expert witnesses upon such question. Kelly v. Industrial
Comm'n, 80 Utah 73, 12 P.2d 1112 (1932).
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Where employee's leg was shorter than other, and he needed crutches to get about, commission's finding that he was
not totally and permanently disabled was supported by evidence since loss of use of one limb is not a permanent total
disability. Mijat v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Utah 371, 44 P.2d 705 (1935).
If there is no substantial conflict in the evidence, an award of the commission as and for total and permanent disability
will be sustained. Caillet v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936).
Where committee of physicians examined claimant and found 75% disability in one arm and 25% in other, with which
findings claimant's physician agreed but contended also that claimant was totally and permanently disabled, evidence
did not compel finding of total permanent disability. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937).
Order of the commission denying additional compensation on ground workman had not become totally and permanently disabled since original finding and award for temporary disability was affirmed although medical testimony was
in conflict; failure to recover within six years after an accident is not conclusive that injury is permanent and total.
Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Utah 140, 91 P.2d 439 (1939).
Although there was substantial evidence from which the commission could reasonably find that the applicant was not
totally and permanently disabled, the case was reversed inasmuch as the only commissioner who heard the evidence did
not participate in the decision. Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321, 148 A.L.R. 316 (1943).
INJURIES.
-- ARM.
Where there was no complete and permanent loss or loss of use of both arms so that claimant would be permanently
disabled as matter of law, it was for commission to decide from all the facts and circumstances in evidence whether he
was so disabled. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937).
-EYE.
Injury to vision of employee from electric flash was not permanent total disability within this section. Moray v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023 (1921).
- MULTIPLE.
A motorman, 64 years old at the time he was injured while uncoupling cars on an underground railroad in a mine, who
lost his leg and suffered additional injuries including fracmre of shoulder blade, dislocation of breastbone-collarbone
joint, severe internal injuries to the chest and lung, including comminuted fractures of ribs three through seven on right
side with attending traumatic pneumonia, and injuries to the scrotum and perineum, was entitled to compensation on
basis of total and permanent disability. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800 (1964).
LAW IN EFFECT.
The law in effect when the injury was sustained governs the amount of the award for a permanent total disability.
Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319 (1946).
An administrative rule promulgated after claimant's industrial accident, but before claimant's application for a hearing
in the matter, which purports to modify this section by adding a quantitative requirement to the causation of the disability analysis when an injured worker has already qualified for Social Security disability benefits, could not be applied
retroactively. Rather, the board should have applied this section, the law existing at the time of claimant's injury. Abel v.
Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
MAXIMUM BENEFITS.
Plaintiff, who received temporary total disability compensation commencing with the date of his injury and later was
paid permanent total disability benefits prior to his return to work, was not entitled to maximum compensation for both
temporary total and permanent partial disability but was entitled only to permanent partial disability benefits subject to
the limitations set forth in this section. Johnson v. Harsco/Heckett, 737 P.2d 986 (Utah 1987).
ODD-LOT DOCTRINE.
When an employee demonstrates that he can no longer perform his normal duties as a result of a work-related accident, and that he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that suitable, steady work is available, considering the age, mental capacity, and education of the employee, in order to preclude a determination of total
and permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine. Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984).
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For discussion of the odd-lot doctrine, see Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt. & Second Injury Fund, 725 P. 2d
1323 (Utah 1986); Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 '(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d
684 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Employee presented a prima facie case entitling him to permanent total disability benefits under the odd-lot doctrine,
where the record was replete with evidence that he was unable to perform the normal duties of his occupation, that he
required the aid of his fellow employees who performed the bulk of his work for him, and that he suffered continual
pain as a result of his industrial injuries. Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572 (1987).
For the odd-lot doctrine to apply, the commission must first determine that there is medical causation between the
petitioner's industrial accident and his now-claimed permanent total disability. Zupon v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d
960 (Utah Ct.App. 1993).
PERMANENT DISABILITY.
If injured employee's earning power is wholly and permanently destroyed, and because of his injuries he is incapable
of performing remunerative employment, such employee is permanently totally disabled and to make out a case of total
disability, the employee is not required to show that he is incapacitated from performing any and all kinds of work. He
is required, however, to put forth an active effort to procure such employment as he is able to perform, for if injured
employee is not prevented from securing and retaining employment because of his injuries, and if he can perform the
duties of such employment without pain or suffering and without unduly endangering his health, life, or limb, the employee is not totally disabled. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206 (1929).
An injured employee in not permanently and totally disabled if, by putting forth a reasonable effort, he is able to prepare himself by training or otherwise to secure and retain remunerative employment. Accordingly, a disability which
may be overcome by a reasonable effort is not permanent, and it is the duty of an injured employee, just as it is the duty
of every person sustaining an injury, to put forth a reasonable effort to minimize his injury. If, however, that injured
employee cannot by training or otherwise secure and retain remunerative employment, the injured employee is excused
from exerting an effort which of necessity must result in failure. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287
P. 931 (1930).
A moron was regarded as having been permanently and totally disabled where he was rendered unfit to perform manual labor, and because of his mental condition was incapable of learning a trade which would fit him for employment in
any line of industry. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287 P. 931 (1930).
Where evidence conclusively shows that employee is permanently and totally disabled from either securing or performing work of the general character that he was performing when injured, he by such evidence establishes a prima
facie case; and in the absence of any showing that he is able to secure and perform work of a special nature not generally available, he is, as a matter of law, entitled to an award as and for permanent total disability. Caillet v. Industrial
Comm'n, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936).
Rule that there is permanent and total disability as a matter of law when it appears that applicant for compensation
cannot secure or perform work of general character he has been doing, and there is no showing that he is able to secure
and perform work of a special nature not generally available, does not operate where specific compensation for loss of a
member or function of a member in provided by statute for permanent partial disability. Babick v. Industrial Comm'n,
91 Utah 581, 65 P.2d 1133 (1937).
Award on basis of total and permanent disability is justified where workman's injuries precluded his doing any work
requiring that he walk, stand, or sit for long periods of time, and he was not of sufficient mental training to enable him
to rehabilitate himself in purely mental work. Carbon Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 Utah 410, 68 P.2d 894 (1937).
-- BENEFITS.
Employee who was totally and permanently impaired from the time of his injury in 1975 to the time when permanent
partial payments terminated, when it had been stipulated that referral to the division of vocational rehabilitation was
unnecessary, was entitled to permanent total benefits on termination of the permanent partial benefits. Heaton v. Second
Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990).
PRIOR ACCIDENTS CONTRIBUTING TO DISABILITY.
Employee who was permanently and totally disabled due to a combination of prior and present accidents was entitled
to lifetime benefits payable from the special fund provided for in § 35-1-68. McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d
153 (Utah 1977).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE COMMISSION.
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in proceeding before commission, doctors may testify as to amount of functional disability of bodily member of human being and impairment person would suffer in ordinary and common activities of life, but not as to percentage of
industrial or economic impairment consequent on loss of certain physical functions unless it is clear they know what
bodily activities or functions a vocation or work embraces, and they cannot testify as to ultimate question as to whether
applicant is economically totally disabled. Price v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 152, 63 P.2d 592 (1937).
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO OPERATION.
Finding of commission that employee was permanently and totally disabled was sustained by evidence, and by refusing to submit to operation employee did not lose his right to compensation where employee had undergone three major
operations which did not prove successful and there was no definite assurance that another would result differently.
Standard Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 118, 16 P.2d 926 (1932).
REVIEW OF PLAN.
In requiring a "review" of an employer's reemployment plan (see Subsection (6)(a)(iii)), the Legislature intended an
independent evaluation and approval of the plan. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, 38 P.3d
969.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
This section governs permanent total disability claims and contains no statute of limitations for such claims; therefore,
where employee suffered an injury in October of 1961 and notice of injury and claim was properly given and filed in
accordance with requirements of former § § 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, and employee was found to have suffered permanent partial disability and received 40 weeks of compensation through December of 1964 and payment of medical bill
through 1966, employee's claim filed in December of 1982 for permanent total disability resulting from the slow deterioration of a condition caused by 1961 injury was timely filed under this section and, under § 35-1-78, commission
had continuing jurisdiction to award permanent total disability compensation. Mecham v. Industrial Comm'n, 692 P.2d
783 (Utah 1984).
TOTAL DISABILITY.
Although employee is incapacitated from performing the kind of labor required in his former employment, if he is
able to perform the work of some other employment, he is not totally disabled. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206(1929).
If employee suffers an injury which permanently and totally disables him, he is entitled to the compensation provided
for in the act without regard to his physical or mental condition before he received such injury. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287 P. 931 (1930).
Workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of the disability resulting from his injury he cannot perform
work of the general character he was performing when injured or any other work which a man of his capabilities may be
able to do or learn to do. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800 (1964).
Employee, who was almost 60, with a limited education and an even more limited work background, presented a
prima facie case of tentative permanent total disability, where he suffered from headaches and dizziness after sustaining
a skull fracture, and despite his employer's contentions that it offered various jobs to employee, the record was devoid
of any concrete evidence that he was offered work of the general nature that he had been performing. Hardman v. Salt
Lake City Fleet Mgt. & Second Injury Fund, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986).
- QUESTION OF FACT.
The question of whether an employee was totally and permanently disabled was one of fact to be decided by the
commission, upon all of the evidence in the case. Kerans v. Industrial Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985).
CITED in Booms v. Rapp Constr. Co., 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986); American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 752
P.2d 912 (Utah Ci. App. 1988); Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Ortiz v. Industrial
Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092 (Ct. App. 1989).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LAW. -Note, Peck v. Eimco Process Equip. Co.: At Odds over the Odd-Lot Doctrine, 15 J. Contemp. L. 111 (1989).
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C.J.S. --100 C.J.S. Workers' Compensation § § 567 to 572.
A.L.R. -Workers' compensation: vocational rehabilitation statutes, 67 A.L.R.4th 612.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Case Nos. 97576,991213,991214,20011070, 20011071,20011072,20011073, and 2002595

FINDINGS OF FACT,

JOHNNY ALBERT,
Petitioner,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

vs.
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND; QUALITY PLATING and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC.
and/or NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.;
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or
HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,

Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse

Respondents,
************************

HEARING:

Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on December 17, 2002 at 08:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order
and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Johnny Albert, was present and represented by his attorney
Richard Burke.
The respondents, Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Quality), were represented by
attorney Elliott K. Morris.
The respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and Workers
Compensation Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as American
Asbestos), were represented by attorney Floyd W. Holm.
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The respondents, Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and National Union Fire
Ins. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Barnard & Burk) , were
represented by attorney Carrie Taylor.
The respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as Ameritemps), were represented by attorney
Theodore E. Kanell.
The respondents, Uninsured Employers' Fund and Employers'
Reinsurance Fund (hereinafter referred to as UEF and ERF respectively),
were represented by attorney Sherrie Hayashi.
The respondent, Transwest Construction (hereinafter Transwest), was a
defunct corporation and did not appear at the hearing. However, the
Uninsured Employers' Fund defended the issues that involved Transwest
at the hearing.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
A.

Claims against Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund in
Case Nos. 91000124 and 20011070.

Johnny Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against
Quality. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against Quality on January 24, 1991
(Case No. 91000124), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical expenses associated
with an industrial accident he suffered at Quality on June 18,1990. On July 2, 1991 Judge
Timothy Allen entered an Order (hereinafter the 1991 Order) that resolved the issues raised in
Case No. 91000124.
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Quality on October 3, 2001 (Case
No. 20011070), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits: (1)
medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No.
20011070 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 18, 1990.
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011070
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Quality in Case No.
20011070 are the claims currently under consideration in the present matter.
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B.

Claims Against American Asbestos Abatement and Workers
Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 93895,97576, 991214, and
20011072.

Mr. Albert filed four "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against
American Asbestos. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against American
Asbestos" on July 15, 1993 (Case No. 93895), and claimed entitlement to: (1) medical expenses;
(2) recommended medical care; (3) temporary total disability compensation, and; (4) permanent
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits against
American Asbestos arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on July 28,1991. On
February 4,1994 Judge Benjamin Sims entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
(hereinafter the 1994 Order) that resolved the issues raised in Case No. 93895.
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on July 15,
1997 (Case No. 97576), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No.
97576 arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on July
28,1991.
Mr. Albert filed his third "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on December
22, 1999 (Case No. 991214), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No.
991214 again arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on
July 28,1991.
Mr. Albert filed his fourth "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on October 3,
2001 (Case No. 20011072), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case
No. 20011072 also arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that
occurred on July 28, 1991.
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 97576,
991214, and 20011072 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims
against American Asbestos in Case Nos. 97576, 991214, and 20011072 are the claims currently
under consideration in the present matter.
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C.

Claims against Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. in Case Nos.
991213 and 20011073.

Mr. Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against Ameritemps on
December 22, 1999 (Case No. 991213), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical
expenses together with recommended medical care related to an industrial accident he suffered at
Ameritemps on June 16,1997.
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Ameritemps on October 3, 2001
(Case No. 20011073), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits:
(1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No.
20011073 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 16,1997.
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 991213
and 20011073 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against
Ameritemps in Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 are the claims currently under consideration in
the present matter.
D.

Claims agamst Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. National Union Fire Ins.
in Case No. 20011071.

Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Barnard & Burk with the Utah Labor
Commission on October 3, 2001 (Case No. 20011071). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to the
following workers' compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability
compensation, and; (3) permanent partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for
workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 20011071 arose out of an industrial accident that
occurred while employed by Barnard & Burk on January 1, 1991.
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011071
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk in
Case No. 20011071 remained under consideration in the present matter.
E.

Claims against Transwest Construction and Uninsured Employers'
Fund in Case No. 2002595.
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Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Transwest with the Utah Labor
Commission on May 21, 2002 (Case No. 2002595). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to
permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits
in Case No. 2002595 arose out of an industrial accident that occurred while employed by
Transwest on November 4,1982.
F.

Position of the Respondents.

The respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and totally disabled. However, each
of the respondents alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended by the
individual respondents directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. Quality Plating
also claimed that the industrial accident of June 8,1990 came up short as the legal cause of Mr.
Albert's back problems.
G.

The Hearing on December 17,2002.

At the conclusion of the hearing on December 17, 2002,1 agreed to leave the evidentiary record
open 30 days for the receipt of some additional medical records. On January 14, 2003 I received
the anticipated medical records and closed the evidentiary record.
II. ISSUES.
1.

What is the direct cause of Johnny Albert's permanent total disability?

2.

Which of the respondents, if any, owe Johnny Albert permanent total disability
compensation?
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

Employment and Compensation Rates.
1.

Transwest Construction.

No dispute existed that Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4, 1982. At the time of
the November 4, 1982 industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no
dependent children.
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Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" against Transwest a wage rate of $9.00 per
hour, and a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr. Albert testified that he earned
$8.00 per hour from Transwest, and worked a 40 hour week on average. When confronted with
the wage rate set forth on the Employers' First Report of Injury in Exhibit "6," Mr. Albert
conceded he probably earned $4.00 per hour and worked 40 hours per week on average.
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his
industrial accident with Transwest on November 4, 1982, Mr. Albert earned $4.00 per hour and
worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers'
compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x 40 hours/week =
$160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week].
2.

Quality Plating.

No dispute existed that Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18, 1990. At the time of the June
18, 1990 industrial accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child.
In Case No. 20011070 involving Quality, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a
wage rate of $5.50 per hour together with a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr.
Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Quality, and worked a 40 hour week on
average. Exhibit "7," The Employers' First Report of Injury filed by Quality with respect to the
June 18,1990 industrial accident, listed a wage rate for Mr. Albert of $5.50 per hour.
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his
industrial accident with Quality on June 18,1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per hour and worked
40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation
rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40 hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3
= $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole
dollar)].
3.

Barnard & Burk.

No dispute existed that Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21, 1991. At the time
of the January 21, 1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but
had one dependent child.
Mr. Albert's testimony at the hearing on December 17, 2002 provided the unrefuted evidence
concerning his wage rate with Barnard & Burk on January 21, 1991. Mr. Albert earned an
average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate
temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week. [$473.20 x
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2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the nearest
whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of January 21,
1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability compensation rate as
of January 21, 1991 equaled $309.00 per week.
4.

American Asbestos Abatement

Judge Sims in his February 4, 1994 Order determined the appropriate workers' compensation
rates for Mr. Albert's July 28, 1991 industrial accident with American Asbestos. Judge Sims
concluded that Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28,1991
[1994 Order at p. 3], which yielded: (1) a temporary total disability compensation rate of $345.00
per week [id. at p. 5]; (2) a permanent partial disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week
[id. at p. 6], and; (3) a permanent total disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week. I
adopted the findings and conclusions of the 1984 Order insofar as consistent with the present
Order.
5.

Ameritemps, Inc.

No dispute existed that Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the
June 16, 1997 industrial accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two
dependent children.
Mr. Albert provided four different wage rates with respect to his employment at Ameritemps. In
Case No. 991213 involving Ameritemps, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a
wage rate of $9.00 per hour together with a 50 hour per workweek average. In case No.
20011073 against Ameritemps, Mr. Albert set forth in his "Application for Hearing" a wage rate
of $8.00 per hour, and a 32 hour per workweek average. In his "Amended Application for
Hearing" filed in Case No. 20011073 Mr. Albert claimed his appropriate temporary total
disability compensation rate should equal $292.33 per week consistent with a "Compensation
Agreement" between Mr. Albert and Ameritemps executed on March 29, 1999. At the hearing
Mr. Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Ameritemps, and worked a 40 hour week
on average.
Ameritemps introduced into evidence Exhibit "2,M a payroll history of Mr. Albert with
Ameritemps from May 17, 1997, to June 21, 1997. Exhibit "2" set forth precise information
concerning Mr. Albert's wages in the five weeks leading up to his industrial accident on June 16,
1997:
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Pay Day

Weekly Gross Pay

May 17,1997

$399.20

May 24,1997

$262.40

May 31,1997

$370.40

June 7,1997

$400.16

June 14,1997

$290.40

Total

si^Lse 1

The best evidence in this case concerning Mr. Albert's average weekly wage with Ameritemps at
the time of his industrial accident on June 16,1997 came from his actual payroll history
contained in Exhibit "2." The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case
established that Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident
on June 16,1997 averaged $344.51. [$1,722.56 - 5 weeks = $344.51/week]. Accordingly, Mr.
Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week.
[$344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10.00/week (dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week
(rounded to nearest whole dollar)].
B.

The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries.
1.

The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest
Construction Case No, 2002595.

The essential facts of Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest stood
undisputed by the parties. On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building
trusses. A stack of the trusses fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert pushed himself out from
under the trusses.
Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week following the November 4,
1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Mr. Albert claimed that between 1982, and 1990, he
sustained no further injuries to his low back.

1

1 did not factor in the last check received by Mr. Albert on June 21, 1997, because his
industrial accident occurred on June 16, 1997 affecting the number of hours he worked that
week.
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a.

Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident
at Transwest Construction.

The parties concurred that no contemporaneous medical records could be located with respect to
the injuries caused by Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident. Of the many medical
opinions in this case, only Dr. Joel Dall M.D. and Dr. Scott Knorp M.D. addressed Mr. Albert's
low back problems in connection with the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest.
On August 15, 2002 Dr. Dall diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Chronic low back pain,
multifactoral...." [Exhibit "J-l" at 113]. Dr. Dall rated Mr. Albert's low back condition:
[cjomplaints of low back pain .... [bjased on his description and my examination
today, I feel he would best fall into Category 1C (see page 16 in Utah's 2002
Impairment Guides) which is awarded five percent whole person impairment, [id.
at 115].
Dr. Dall determined that:
[bjased on the fact that he lost no time from work I would apportion 0 percent of
his back injury to the incident at Tram Core2 on 11-18-19823." [id.].
On November 25,2002 Dr. Knorp also diagnosed Mr. Albert with '^Nonspecific subjective low
back pain...." [id. at 21]. Dr. Knorp commented concerning a rating for Mr. Albert's low back
condition:
Quite frankly, it is my best medical judgment that there is no objective medical
evidence, and certainly no consistent or reliable historical information to support
any ratable impairment offered on behalf of Mr. Albert with respect to his spinal
complaints, [id. at26]. 4

2

Actually Transwest.

3

As determined supra Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Transwest in fact occurred on
November 4,1982.
4

Dr. Knorp in another portion of his opinion seemed to hedge his bets with a facetious
3% whole person impairment rating postulated by cynically disregarding all of what Dr. Knorp
deemed valid objective medical and historical evidence, [id. at 26]. Accordingly, I gave no
consideration to Dr. Knorp's ironic 3% impairment rating.
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The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case supported the opinion rendered by
Dr. Dall that Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole
person impairment.5 The medical record in this case contained a consistent chronology of
treatment for back pain suffered by Mr. Albert over a span of years, [see gen: id. at pp. 147-148,
150,254-258, 260-300, 302, 310-318]. However, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's 5%
permanent partial impairment to his industrial accident of November 4,1982. Therefore, while
Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole person impairment, none
of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November 1982 industrial accident at
Transwest.
b.

Workers'Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident

Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. As set forth in Section
IILC. 1 .a. supra Mr. Albert suffered no permanent impairment from his November 4,1982
industrial accident with Transwest. Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial
accident could not have caused his permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim
against Transwest and UEF for permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with
prejudice.
2.

The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Qualitj Plating Case No.
20011070.
a.

Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at
Quality Plating.

No dispute existed concerning the essential facts of Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Quality.
On June 18, 1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems
sustained in the June 18, 1990 industrial accident. Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5%
whole person impairment from his chronic low back pain to the June 18,1990 incident.

5

Utah Administrative Code R. 602-2-2.A.2. requires that a medical controversy over an
impairment rating over 5% be sent to a medical panel for consideration. In the present matter the
discrepancy between Dr. Knorp's 0% impairment rating and Dr. Dall's 5% whole person
impairment rating did not exceed 5%. Therefore no necessity existed for the referral of this issue
to a medical panel.
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b.

The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert went to Dr. Theodore Conger D.C.
for treatment of his low back. [id. at 289]. Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work
Injury" on June 23,1990. [id.].
Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not establish legal causation between his industrial accident
on June 18,1990, and the low back problems he complained of thereafter. As set forth in
Section IILC. 1 .a. no contemporary records existed that documented the nature of Mr. Albert's
low back injury on November 4, 1982. Further, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's
ratable low back impairment to the November 4,1982 industrial accident. Finally, no medical
records existed that showed Mr. Albert suffered from any ongoing low back problems between
his accident on November 4,1982, and the accident of June 18, 1990. In short, Quality failed to
establish that Mr. Albert suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he
sustained on June 18,1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal
causation hurdle enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729
P. 2d 15, 24-25 (Utah 1986).
c.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19, 1990, to June 25, 1990, when
Dr. Conger released him back to work. [Exhibit "J-l" at 289]. Consequently, Qaulity and/or
WCF owed Mr. Albert $65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus
three, he missed work due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality.6 [$152.00/week x
$.43 weeks (three days) = $65.36].
d.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

6

Utah Code §34A-2-408, formerly Utah Code §35-1-64, does not allow temporary total
disability compensation for the first three days of the disability unless the disability lasts more
than 14 days.
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Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back
pain to the June 18, 1990 industrial accident at Quality. [Exhibit "J-l" at 115]. As set forth in
Section IILC.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation for a 2lA % whole person impairment
causedby the June 18, 1990 industrial accident. [$152.00/weekx 312 weeks x 0.025 =
$1,185.60].
e.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

For the reasons set forth in Section HI.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June
18,1990 did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality
and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation.
3.

The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk
Group, Inc. Case No, 20011071.
a.

Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc.

The essential facts of Mr. Albert's January 21, 1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk came
in undisputed. On January 21, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for Barnard & Burk removing asbestos
at the Chevron Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back. Mr.
Albert described his low back as "all messed up" and went to a chiropractor for treatment. On
January 22, 1991 Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work Injury" with respect to
Mr. Albert's January 21, 1991 industrial accident with Barnard & Burk. [id. at 260].
b.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins,
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident.

At the hearing, Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January
21, 2001 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert
no temporary total disability as a result of the January 21, 1991 industrial accident.
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c.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident.

Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back
pain to the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. [id. at 115]. As set forth in
Section HLC.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union owed
Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the January 21,
2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,895.40].
d.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident.

For the reasons set forth in Section IH.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the
January 21, 2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total
disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent
total disability compensation.
4.

The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072.
a.

Injuries Caused by the July 28,1991 Industrial Accident at
American Asbestos Abatement.

No dispute existed concerning the facts of Mr. Albert's July 28, 1991 industrial accident. On
July 28, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert fell
more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot.
On July 30, 1991 Dr. Kenneth Jee M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with a: "right comminuted
calcaneus7 fracture." [id. at 377]. Also on July 30, 2001 Dr. Jee operated on Mr. Albert and
performed a:
Closed reduction with percutaneous pin manipulation and fixation right
comminuted calcaneus fracture, [id.].

7

Largest of the tarsal bones that form the heel of the foot.
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On July 24, 1992 Dr. David Howe M.D. concluded that Mr. Albert still suffered from:
"Traumatic arthritis subtalar joint right foot." [id. at 367]. Also on July 24, 1992 Dr. Howe
performed the second operation on Mr. Albert's right foot a: "Subtalar arthrodesis8 with bone
graft from right illiac crest." On March 17,1993 Dr. Howe in a third operative procedure on Mr.
Albert's right foot removed the hardware from the second operation, [id. at 370].
Judge Sim's 1994 Order concluded that Mr. Albert's right foot injury caused by his industrial
accident of July 28, 1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person impairment." [1994 Order at
p. 4]. As noted in Section LB. supra, I adopted the findings and conclusions contained in the
1994 Order insofar as consistent with the present Order. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's right foot
injury caused by his industrial accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person
impairment."
b.

Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident

As set forth in Section LB. supra, the 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total
and permanent partial disability compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr.
Albert as a result of the July 28,1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any
additional periods of temporary total disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment,
resultant from the July 28, 1991 industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF
owed Mr. Albert no additional temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation
for the July 21, 1991 industrial accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order.
c.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial
Accident

For the reasons set forth in Section III.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July
28, 2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability.
Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability
compensation.

Fusion.
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5.

The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case
Nos. 991213 and 20011073.
a.

Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at
Ameritemps, Inc.

Again, no dispute existed concerning the factual circumstances of Mr. Albert's June 16, 1997
industrial accident with Ameritemps. On June 16,1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at
Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between
the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam.
On June 30, 1997 Dr. Stephen Shultz M.D. took an x-ray of Mr. Albert's left foot and
discovered:
Significantly angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx with probable intraarticular extension. [Exhibit "J-l" at 322].
Also on June 30,1997 Dr. William Burleigh DPM operated on Mr. Albert's left foot, which
consisted of an: "Open-reduction internal fixation, left hallux.9" [id. at 354-355]. On November
14, 1997 Dr. Burleigh performed a second operation on Mr. Albert's left foot that involved:
"Arthroplasty hallux left foot." [id. at 342].
On March 11, 1998 Dr. Howe diagnosed Mr. Albert with; "Traumatic arthritis to proximate
interphalangeal joint of left great toe." [id. at 368]. Dr. Howe operated on Mr. Albert's left foot
for the third surgical procedure: "Left great toe proximal interphalangeal joint fusion with bone
graft from left tibia." [id.].
On July 31,1998 Dr. How determined that Mr. Albert had a: "Failed fusion left great toe
interphalangeal joint." [id. at 365]. Consequently, Dr. Howe performed the fourth operation on
Mr. Albert's left foot a repeat: "Fusion of left great toe interphalangeal joint with bone graft from
left tibia." [id.].
On February 25, 1999 Dr. Howe gave Mr. Albert an impairment rating for his left foot injuries
sustained in the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, [id. at 148]. Dr. Howe found:

9

Great toe.
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In trying to find a partial impairment for the great toe of Johnny's left foot I have
had to go to the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment. 3 rd Edition. The 4th Edition only talks about the MP joint
of the great toe, it does not talk about the IP joint of the great toe. From table 24
on page 56, with the IP joint fused at 0 degrees he deserves a 45% impairment of
the great toe. Table 27, page 59 of this correlates to an 8% impairment of the foot
which using table 36 page 65 correlates to a 6% lower extremity impairment
which according to table 46 page 72 correlates to a 2% whole person impairment,
[id.].
On August 15, 2002 Dr. Joel Dall provided an impairment rating for Mr. Albert's left foot
injuries sustained in the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, [id. at 115]. Dr. Dall concluded that:
In regards to the toe injury, the Fifth Edition refers to Table 17-30 for impairment
due to ankylosis10 in the toes. His great toe is ankylosed in a position of function
which provides a four percent whole person impairment, [id.].
Because Dr. Dall used the more current and applicable Fifth Edition to the American Medical
Associations Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, I found his impairment rating
to be better supported than that given by Dr. Howe based on the Third Edition. Accordingly, the
preponderance of the better supported medical evidence in this case favored the rating supplied
by Dr. Dall with respect to Mr. Albert's left foot injuries sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial
accident. Therefore the preponderance of the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's
industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997 caused him a 4% whole person
impairment due to his left foot injury.11
b.

10

Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or
Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997
Industrial Accident.

Bone fusion.

11

Ameritemps questioned Mr. Albert concerning a number of incidents where Mr. Albert
sustained trauma to his left great toe after the June 16,1997 industrial accident. However, no
medical evidence existed that demonstrated a causal connection between the subsequent
incidents referred to by Ameritemps and a significant, or ratable, impairment to Mr. Albert's left
foot other than that caused by his June 16, 1997 industrial accident.
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With the exception of one day at Erickson Construction, Mr. Albert never worked again after the
June 16, 1997 industrial accident. Ameritemps claimed that it paid Mr. Albert $25,098.00 in
temporary total disability compensation from June 16, 1997, to February of 1999. Mr. Albert did
not contradict the assertions of Ameritemps with respect to the payment of temporary total
disability compensation. Neither party addressed the payment of permanent partial disability
compensation with respect to Mr. Albert's June 16,1997 industrial accident. Because of the
resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further consideration of the
issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial disability
compensation.
C.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation.
1.

Permanent Total Disability.

As set forth in Section LF. supra, the respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and
totally disabled. However, each of the respondents denied that the respective industrial accident
associated with that particular respondent caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability.
2.

The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability.

Mr. Albert incurred a 2Vi % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he
sustained on June 18, 1990 while employed for Quality Plating, [see: Section HLB.2. supra]. Mr.
Albert remained off work only one week following his June 18,1990 industrial injury then
returned to regular employment with Quality Plating, [see: Section IILB.2.a. supra].
Mr. Albert also incurred a 2lA % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he
sustained on January 21, 1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. [see: Section IILB.3. supra],
Mr. Albert did not identify any lost time from work as a result of his January 21, 1991 industrial
accident, [see: Section III.B.3.b. supra].
Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28, 1991 resulted in a 9% whole
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident, [see: Section
III.BAa. supra]. Because of the injuries cause to Mr. Albert's right foot by his industrial accident
on July 28, 1991, Dr. Jee stated:
He should be retrained for an occupation that will not involve prolonged walking
or standing. Furthermore, he cannot climb up ladders, or heights, due to risk of
falling. An ideal position would either involve a job at a work bench sitting or a
desk job. Exhibit "J-l" at 233].
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On November 30, 1993 Dr. Howe described Mr. Albert's "Functional Work Capacity" as result
of his right foot injuries from the July 28, 1991 industrial accident:
Preclusion from heavy lifting, climbing ladders, working at heights and from
frequent walking, squatting, kneeling and stair climbing, [id. at 212].
Nevertheless, after a lengthy convalescence Mr. Albert sallied forth again into the work force at
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997 resulted in a
4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the accident, [see:
Section III.B.S.a. supra]. Because of the injuries caused to Mr. Albert's left foot by his industrial
accident on June 16,1997, Dr. Howe stated:
Johnny has worked a heavy labor type job. I told him in theory he could return to
a light duty job, basically a sit-down job. He cannot walk much except to and
from work, should not be doing any carrying, lifting, etc. [Exhibit "J-l" at 156].
Unfortunately, Mr. Albert also suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him
considerable difficulty in learning new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity.
After Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28, 1991, Barry Richards
LCSW noted that:
At this time Johnny's primary (expressed) symptoms are indicative of a normal
post-traumatic stress response (survival honey moon), with no apparent major
PTSD symptoms, [id. at 251].
On November 30, 1993 Dr. Richard Knoeble M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Severe
Depression." [id. at 212]. On March 30,1994 Ralf Gant PhD. completed a full scale
psychological assessment of Mr. Albert that revealed:
Johnny produced ... a full scale IQ Score of 83 placing him, by DSMIII-R
Standards, in the borderline range of intellectual functioning.
A review of the WAIS-R psychograph indicates severe deficits in long term
memory, general verbal knowledge, short term memory and attention, general use
of the language, arithmetic and concentration, impulse control and judgment and
abstract and logical thinking, [id, at 195].
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Dr. Gant diagnosed Mr. Albert with: "[rjeactive major depression to Johnny's work-related
injuries and his perceived losses." [id. at 198]. Dr. Gant further noted the causal connection
between Mr. Albert's industrial injuries and many of his psychological problems when he
observed that:
As a consequence of his reactive depression there is marked restriction in his
activities of daily living. He experiences marked difficulties in maintaining social
functioning. There are constant deficiencies of concentration. With his
unresolved physical conditions there is significant deficiency of persistence or
pace resulting in his inability to complete tasks in a timely manner, particularly in
a work setting. There has been a continual process of deterioration and
decompensation since his work injuries, leaving him to withdraw from work. His
adaptive behavior since his injuries has been very poor. [id.].
Dr. Gant concluded with cautious optimism that:
[w]ith assistance from a rehabilitation program, Johnny could utilize his average
to high average residual skills. With appropriate intervention Johnny might yet be
restored to his role as a productive worker, [id.].
Mr. Albert attended Vocational Rehabilitation and with all of his physical and psychological
problems did in fact return to work with Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on June 16,
1997. However, after Mr. Albert fractured his left great toe on June 16,1997, followed by four
consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert did not return to work.
On October 25, 2002 Leslie Cooper PhD. performed another fiill scale psychological assessment
of Mr. Albert that disclosed:
Shiply Institute of Living Scale - Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised Full
Scale IQ of 75 which falls at the 5th percentile and falls at the Borderline Mentally
Deficient range of intellectual functioning, [id. at 84].
The Beck Depression Inventory-II... His obtained raw score of 29 suggested
moderate depression, [id. at 85].
On October 22, 2002 Dr. David McCann M.D. comprehensively diagnosed Mr. Albert's
psychological problems as:
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Axis I - (Clinical Psychiatric Disorders)
1. Depressive Disorder....
2. Learning Disorder, Reading.
3. Written Communication Disorder, Spelling.
4. Cognitive Disorder .... [id. at 41].
Axis II - (Personality Disorder or Disordered Personality Traits)
1. Personality Disorder, not otherwise specified, with Paranoid,
Borderline, and Antisocial Traits.
2. Borderline Intellectual Functioning
Axis V - (Global Assessment of Functioning)
The patient is not able to understand the complexities of his current
situation and is significantly out of touch with reality. He exhibits anger
impairment in work, family relations, judgment, and mood .... [id. at 42].
Dr. McCann proceeded to give Mr. Albert the only impairment rating for his psychological
problems, and apportioned the impairment:
According to the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition, he has a Class 2 or mild impairment in
activities of daily functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in social
functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in concentration and Class 4 or
marked impairment in ability to adapt. Using traditional Utah concepts of
percentages, his overall estimated psychiatric impairment is Class 3 or probably in
this case about a 30% whole person impairment.
Of the patient's 30% impairment 10% is caused by his preexisting borderline
intellectual functioning, 10% is caused by his disordered personality traits and
lack of ability to conceptualize reality and about 10% is related to his injuries and
chronic pain.12 [id. at 43].

12

Dr. McCann did not further apportion the 10% psychological impairment caused by
Mr. Albert's industrial injuries between those respective injuries.
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In sum, Mr. Albert sustained a 5% whole person impairment from his back injuries caused half
and half respectively by the June 8, 1990 industrial accident at Quality, and the January 21, 1991
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert incurred a 9% whole person impairment from
his right foot injuries caused by his July 28, 1991 industrial accident at American Asbestos. Mr.
Albert sustained a 4% whole person impairment from his left foot injuries caused by his June 16,
1997 industrial accident with Ameritemps. Finally, Mr. Albert had a 30% whole person
impairment from psychological problems. Of Mr. Albert's psychological impairment, 20%
preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his industrial injuries.
Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% impaired as to the
whole person.
Yet at the end of the day, the preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed that despite the
legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by Mr. Albert during the course
of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on June 16,1997 with
Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16, 1997, with the subsequent four surgeries and
4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the
camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial accident, and
thereafter by consensus remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, the preponderance of
the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997 acted
as the direct cause of his permanent total disability.
3.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins, as a Result of Johnny Albert's
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident.

Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997 directly caused his permanent total disability,
[see: Section III.C.2.supra]. Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June
16,1997. The preponderance of the evidence in this case confirmed that Mr. Albert became
permanently and totally disabled on June 16, 1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16,
1997, to June 17, 2003. After June 17, 2003, Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert on an
ongoing basis permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any
Social Security retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps
and Hartford are additionally entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or
permanent partial, disability compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also
owed Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Employment and Compensation Rates.
1.

Transwest Construction.

Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4,1982. At the time of the November 4,1982
industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no dependent children.
At the time of his industrial accident with Transwest on November 4, 1982, Mr. Albert earned
$4.00 per hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's
appropriate workers' compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x
40 hours/week = $160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week].
2.

Quality Plating.

Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June 18, 1990 industrial
accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child.
At the time of his industrial accident with Quality on June 18,1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per
hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate
workers' compensation rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40
hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3 = $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) =
$ 152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)].
3.

Barnard & Burk.

Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21, 1991. At the time of the January 21, 1991
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child.
Mr. Albert earned an average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr.
Albert's appropriate temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week.
[$473.20 x 2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the
nearest whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of
January 21, 1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability
compensation rate as of January 21, 1991 equaled $309.00 per week.
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4.

American Asbestos Abatement.

Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate with American Asbestos equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28,
1991, which yielded: (1) a temporary total disability compensation rate of $345.00 per week; (2)
a permanent partial disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week, and; (3) a permanent total
disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week.
5#

Ameritemps, Inc.

Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the June 16,1997 industrial
accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two dependent children.
Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident on June 16,
1997 averaged $344.51. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with
Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week. [ $344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10.00/week
(dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)].
B.

The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries.
1.

The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest
Construction Case No. 2002595.

On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building trusses. A stack of the trusses
fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week
following the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Between 1982, and 1990, Mr.
Albert sustained no further injuries to his low back.
a.

Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident
at Transwest Construction.

Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole person
impairment. While Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole
person impairment, none of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November
1982 industrial accident at Transwest.
b.

Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident.
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Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert suffered no
permanent impairment from his November 4, 1982 industrial accident with Transwest.
Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident could not have caused his
permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim against Transwest and UEF for
permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with prejudice.
2.

The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No.
20011070.
a.

Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at
Quality Plating.

On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident.
b.

The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

The Utah Supreme Court held that:
The language "arising out of or in the course of his employment"... was apparently
intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is sufficient
causal connection between the disability and the working conditions. The
causation requirement makes it necessary to distinguish those injuries which (a)
coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms
which appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace,
and (b) those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required by
the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally faces in
his everyday life. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15, 24-25
(Utah 1986).
The Court in Allen then adopted an analysis that involved a two part causation test to establish
both legal causation and medical causation. Id. at 25. With respect to legal causation the Court in
Allen held that:
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To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition
must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This additional
element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater than
that undertaken in normal everyday life. This extra exertion serves to offset the
preexisting condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby
eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than
exertions at work.
Thus, where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes
to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal
causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is
sufficient. Id. at 25-26.
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not
establish legal causation between his industrial accident on June 18,1990, and the low back
problems he complained of thereafter. However, Quality failed to establish that Mr. Albert
suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he sustained on June 18,
1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal causation hurdle enunciated by
the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d at 24-25.
c.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19, 1990, to June 25, 1990, when
Dr. Conger released him back to work. Consequently, Qaulity and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert
$65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus three, he missed work
due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality. [$152.00/week x $.43 weeks (three days)
= $65.36].
d.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

The June 18, 1990 industrial accident at Quality caused half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person
impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert
$ 1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the June 18,1990
industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,185.60].
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e.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident.

The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June 18, 1990 did not constitute the direct cause of
his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent
total disability compensation.
3.

The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk
Group, Inc. Case No. 20011071.
a.

Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc.

On January 21, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for Barnard & Burk removing asbestos at the Chevron
Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back.
b.

Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident.

Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January 21, 2001
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert no
temporary total disability as a result of the January 21, 1991 industrial accident.
c.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident.

The January 21, 1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk caused half of Mr. Albert's 5%
whole person impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and
National Union owed Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation
consequent to the January 21, 2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 =
$1,895.40].
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d.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins.
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial
Accident.

The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the January 21, 2001 industrial accident did not
constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and
National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation.
4.

The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072.

On July 28,1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert
fell more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot. Mr. Albert
suffered a: "right comminuted calcaneus fracture." Mr. Albert underwent three surgeries on his
right foot consequent to his July 28, 1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's right foot injury
caused by his industrial accident of July 28, 1991 resulted in a 9% whole person impairment.
b.

Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident.

The 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total and permanent partial disability
compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr. Albert as a result of the July 28,
1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any additional periods of temporary total
disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment, resultant from the July 28,1991
industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF owed Mr. Albert no additional
temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation for the July 21,1991 industrial
accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order.
c.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial
Accident.

The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July 28,2001 industrial accident did not constitute
the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did
not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation.
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5.

The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case
Nos. 991213 and 20011073.
a.

Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at
Ameritemps, Inc.

On June 16, 1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled
pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam.
Mr. Albert suffered an angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx as a result of the June 16,
1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert underwent four surgeries with respect to the left great toe
fracture sustained in June 16, 1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with
Ameritemps on June 16, 1997 caused him a 4% whole person impairment due to his left foot
injury.
IK

Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or
Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997
Industrial Accident.

Because of the resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further
consideration of the issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent
partial disability compensation.
C.

Permanent Total Disability Compensation.
1.

Permanent Total Disability.

Mr. Albert is permanently and totally disabled.
2.

The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability.

Mr. Albert sustained a 2lA % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he
sustained on June 18, 1990 while employed for Quality Plating. Mr. Albert remained off work
only one week following his June 18, 1990 industrial injury then returned to regular employment
with Quality Plating.
Mr. Albert also sustained a 2lA % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he
sustained on January 21,1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert did not identify
any lost time at work as a result of his January 21,1991 industrial accident.
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Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28, 1991 resulted in a 9% whole
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident. Mr. Albert also
suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him considerable difficulty in learning
new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity. Mr. Albert's psychological
problems left him with 30% whole person impairment. Of Mr. Albert's psychological
impairment, 20% preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his
industrial injuries. Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48%
impaired as to the whole person.
Mr. Albert with all of his physical and psychological problems did in fact return to work with
Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on June 16,1997. However, after Mr. Albert
fractured his left great toe on June 16, 1997 followed by four consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert
did not return to work. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997
resulted in a 4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the
accident.

The Utah Supreme Court specifically held that in permanent total disability cases it is the duty of
the Labor Commission to determine the ultimate issue of disability. Hardman v. Salt Lake City
Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d 1323,1326 (Utah 1986). Professor Larson stated that:
Apart from apportionment statutes, the employer is generally held liable for the
entire disability resulting from a combination of the prior disability and the
present injury. ARTHUR LARSON and LEX LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS* COMPENSATION
LAW §90.01(2002).
Neither applicable Utah Code Amend § 35-1-67 (1995), nor its successors, nor its predecessors
that deal with permanent total disability, contain any provisions for apportionment of liability.
Utah Code Amend § 35-l-67(l)(b) (1995) provides in relevant part that:
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee
has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(ii) the industrial accident... was the direct cause of the employee's
permanent total disability.
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The Utah Court of Appeals held that:
Under the codd lot' doctrine, the Commission may find permanent total disability
when a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial accident
is combined with other factors to render the claimant unable to obtain suitable
employment. Hoskins v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 918 P. 2d 150,154 (Utah
App. 1996) (citing: Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d
1323,1326 (Utah 1986).
The case of Smith v. Mity Lite presented facts similar to the present case. Smith v. Mity Lite, 939
P. 2d 684 (Utah App. 1997). In Smith the claimant suffered from nonindustrial depression,
somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, personality disorder and depression, id. at 689.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the Labor Commission ought to have found permanent total
disability where the claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence the: "[industrial
accident caused a portion of Smith's physical impairment; that he cannot perform his former job;
that he is currently disabled." id. at 690.
In the present case, despite the legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by
Mr. Albert during the course of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on
June 16,1997 with Amentemps. The fractured great toe on June 16, 1997, with the subsequent
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw
that broke the camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial
accident, and thereafter remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, Mr. Albert's
industrial accident of June 16,1997directly caused his permanent total disability.13

3,

Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident.

13

Some of the respondents argued that Social Security Administration's determination of
Mr. Albert's permanent total disability based on his psychological impairments should be
determinative concerning the cause of his permanent total disability for workers' compensation
benefits. Of course Social Security's determinations are not binding on the Labor Commission.
Otherwise, the Labor Commission in every like case would simply await and adopt the decision
of the Social Security Administration as to permanent total disability and the cause thereof.
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Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997 directly caused his permanent total disability.
Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June 16, 1997. Mr. Albert became
permanently and totally disabled on June 16, 1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16,
1997, to June 17, 2003. After June 17, 2003 Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert
permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any Social Security
retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps and Hartford are
entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or permanent partial, disability
compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also owed Mr. Albert permanent
total disability compensation.
V. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondent,
Transwest Construction, in Claim No. 2002595 are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondents
Uninsured Employer's Fund and Employers' Reinsurance Fund in Case Nos. 97576,
991213, 991214, 20011070, 20011071, 20011072,20011073, and 2002595 are hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert temporary total disability
compensation from June 18,1990, to June 25,1990, at the rate of $152.00 per week for 0.43
weeks, for a total of $65.36. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability
compensation for a two and one half percent (2lA %) impairment rating at the rate of $ 152.00
per week for a total of $1,185.60. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims for permanent total disability
compensation against Quality Plating and Workers' Compensation Fund in Case No.
20011070 are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Quality Plating and/or Workers Compensation Fund
shall with respect to Case No. 20011070 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny
Albert's industrial accident of June 18, 1990, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claim against Barnard & Burk and/or
National Union Fire Ins. for temporary total disability compensation in Case No. 20011071
is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011071 respondents, Barnard & Burk
and/or National Union Fire Ins., shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability
compensation for a two and one half percent (2lA %) impairment rating at the rate of $243.00
per week for a total of $1,895.40. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk and
National Union Fire Ins, in Case No. 20011071 for permanent total disability compensation
are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Barnard & Burk and/or National Union
Fire Ins., shall with respect to Case No. 20011071 pay all medical expenses reasonably related
to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21,1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per
annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against American Asbestos
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072
for additional temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial disability
compensation, and permanent total disability compensation are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and/or
Workers Compensation Fund shall with respect to Case Nos. 97576, 991214, and 20011072
pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of July 28,
1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins. in Case Nos.
991213 and 20011073 shall pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the
rate of $240.00 per week from the date of permanent total disability on June 16, 1997, until June
16, 2003 in the total amount of $74,880.00, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum for
each payment as it came due, less any compensation already paid by respondents Ameritemps,
Inc. or Hartford Ins. After June 16, 2003, respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins.,
shall continue to pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of
$240.00 per week less fifty percent (50%) of any Social Security retirement benefits received by
Johnny Albert for the same period.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall
with respect to Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to
Johnny Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per
annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall
pay statutory attorneys9 fees of $10,352.00 directly to Richard Burke. That amount shall be
deducted from Johnny Albert's award and sent directly to Richard Burke's office.
Dated this 22nd day of July 2003,

j Rifehard M. La Jeunesse
^x^dministrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
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American Asbestos Abatement et al, Case Nos. 97576, 991213, 991214, 20011070, 20011071,
20011072, 20011073, and 2002595 on the J ^ ^ d a y of July 2003, to the following:
JOHNNY ALBERT
2550 W 2780 S APT 171
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119
RICHARD BURKE ESQ
648E100SSTE200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
CARRIE TAYLOR ESQ
PO BOX 2465
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465
ELLIOT MORRIS ESQ
392E6400S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
FLOYD HOLM ESQ
392E6400S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
THEODORE KANELL ESQ
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE STE 1700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
LORRIE LIMA ESQ
160 E 300 S THIRD FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841111

KarlaRush

00528

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
JOHNNY ALBERT,
Petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
QUALITY PLATTING CO and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. and
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.;
AMERITEMPS, INC. and HARTFORD
INS.; TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION;
UNINSURANCED EMPLOYERS' FUND
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION
Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213,
99-1214,01-1070,01-1071,
01-1072, 01-1073, & 02-0595

Respondents.

Barnard & Burk and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, National Union Fire
Insurance (referred to jointly as "Barnard" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor
Commission to reconsider its prior determination awarding benefits to Johnny Albert under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §6346b-13.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to pay permanent partial disability compensation and
medical expenses arising from a back injury Mr. Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21, 1991.
Barnard then sought Appeals Board review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision on the grounds that Mr.
Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1) of the Act and his claim for permanent
partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2) of the Act. In response, Mr. Albert argued that,
because Barnard failed to raise its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, Barnard waived
those defenses.
In its decision issued May 3,2004, the Appeals Board concluded that Barnard had waived its
§417 defenses. The Appeals Board therefore affirmed Judge La Jeunesse's award of benefits to Mr.
Albert. Barnard now asks the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. Barnard argues that it: 1)
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was under no obligation to raise its §417(1) defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim; and 2) did,
in fact, adequately raise its §417 defenses.
DISCUSSION
Barnard's obligation to raise its $4170) defense. Section § 417(1) of the Act contains the
following restriction to an injured worker's right to receive medical treatment for work-related
injuries (emphasis added):
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three
consecutive years the employee does not:
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance
carrier for payment.
Barnard argues that it was not required to raise the foregoing statute's three year "incur and
submit" requirement as a defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim because the defense only
applies to "nonpermanent total disability cases," and at the time Barnard filed its answer, Mr.
Albert's claim was for permanent total disability.
As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Board notes that Barnard failed to raise this issue in its
original motion for review. Section 63-46b-12(l)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
requires a party seeking agency review to "state the grounds for review." This requirement is
necessary to avoid piecemeal review proceedings. Because Barnard failed to raise this issue as a
grounds for review in its initial motion for review, the Appeals Board declines to consider the issue
for the first time as part of this reconsideration proceeding.
But even if the Appeals Board were to consider the merits of Barnard's new argument, the
Appeals Board would reject that argument. Mr. Albert's application for hearing made a claim for
both permanent total disability compensation and medical benefits. The claim for medical benefits
was not dependent upon the claim for permanent total disability compensation. It was therefore
Barnard's obligation to raise in its answer all its defenses to the medical claim, including its §417(1)
defense.
Sufficiency of Barnard's $417 defenses. Having concluded that Barnard was required to raise
its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, the Appeals Board must consider whether
Barnard did so. Barnard's answer contained only vague and tentative references to statutes of
limitation and notice provisions that might be found somewhere in the Workers' Compensation Act
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or Occupational Disease Act. Barnard's answer did not "state all affirmative defenses with sufficient
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted/' as
required by the Commission's Rule 602-2-1.D.
Barnard argues that even if its answer was not sufficient under the Commission's Rule 602-21 .D to preserve its §417 defenses, its answer was sufficient under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and appellate precedent interpreting those rules. However, it is the Commission's rules that govern
adjudicative process before the Commission. Consequently, the Appeals Board looks to the
Commission's Rule R602-2-1.D, rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to evaluate the
sufficiency of Barnard's answer.
For the reasons already discussed in this decision and in the Appeals Board's previous
decision, the Appeals Board concludes that Barnard's answer did not raise its §417 defenses and that
those defenses were, therefore, waived.
ORDER
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Barnard's request for
reconsideration. It is so ordered.
Dated this /IT day of October, 2004.

3t ^V>/ X)t/UtK~
Patricia S. Drawe

J^fer

Joseph E. Hatch

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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ELLIOT LAWRENCE, ATTORNEY
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OUTCOME: The court affirmed the order of the Board.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: Theodore E. Kanell and Joseph C.
Alamilla, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners.

CASE SUMMARY:
Richard R. Burke, James R. Black, Alan L. Hemiebold,
and Floyd W. Holm, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, an employer
and its insurer, sought judicial review of the Utah Labor
Commission Appeals Board's denial of their motion for
review of a decision of a Commission Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) awarding appellee employee permanent total disability compensation benefits under Utah
Code Ann. >V 34A-2-4I3 (Supp. 2005).

JUDGES: Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Thome.
OPINIONBY: Carolyn B. McHugh
OPINION: Original Proceeding in this Court
"

OVERVIEW: After severely injuring one foot while on
the job, the employee never returned to work. The ALJ
determined that the employee was permanently and totally disabled and that the foot injury directly caused his
disability. The Board's decision was issued after the initial determination of total permanent disability, but before any opportunity for appellants to submit a reemployment plan. The court held that the order was a final
agency action. In the Board's order denying the request
for reconsideration, the "Notice of Appeal Rights" section identified an appeal to the court as the only review
available. When the Board denied the request for reconsideration, that marked the end of its decision making
process concerning the issue of permanent total disability. Although the order left unresolved the issue of reemployment, it decided permanent total disability with finality. Therefore, the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The court also held that given that
the Board made the appropriate findings to support its
conclusion under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-4l3(I)(b)(i)(iii), its conclusion did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.

McHUGH, Judge:
[*P1] Ameritemps, Inc. (Ameritemps) and Hartford Insurance (collectively, Petitioners) seek judicial
review of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission)
Appeals Board's (Board) denial of their motion for review of a decision of a Commission Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) awarding Johnny Albert permanent total
disability compensation benefits. See Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-4I3 (Supp. 2005). nl We affirm.

nl We recognize that "in workers' compensation claims, the law existing at the time of the injury applies in relation to that injury." Brown &
Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d
67 L 675 (Utah 1997). Because the relevant portions of the current version of this statute, see
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-4I3 (Supp. 2005), are
substantively identical to the relevant portions of
the version in effect at the time of Albert's injury, see Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp.
1995), we cite to the most current version
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throughout this opinion as a convenience to the
reader.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] Over the span of approximately seven years,
Albert was injured in a number of industrial accidents
that occurred while he was working for various employers. With the exception of his final accident, Albert returned to work after each incident, despite having suffered some level of whole person impairment. In his final
industrial accident, which occurred on June 16, 1997,
while he was working for Ameritemps, Albert severely
injured his left foot. Although he had four separate surgeries to correct the problems that resulted from this injury, Albert never returned to work.
[*P3| Thereafter, Albert filed a claim with the
Commission against Ameritemps for, among other
things, permanent total disability compensation benefits.
On December 17. 2002, a hearing was held before the
ALJ, which addressed numerous claims Albert had filed
with the Commission, including his claims against
Ameritemps. Albert's other claims were for disability
benefits arising out of industrial accidents that occurred
while he was working for employers other than Ameritemps. On July 22, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision regarding Albert's claims.
[*P4] As an initial matter, the ALJ [**3] noted in
the decision that all of the parties opposing Albert's
claims, including Ameritemps, had "conceded that [he]
was permanently and totally disabled," but that each
party "alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended by [each party] directly caused [Albert's
permanent and total disability." The ALJ found, based
upon a medical evaluation contained in the record, that
the left foot injury Albert had suffered while working for
Ameritemps "caused him a 4% whole person impairment." The ALJ also found that

the preponderance of the evidence in this
case revealed that despite the legion of
medical and psychological impairments
accumulated by [Albert] during the
course of his life, he remained able to
work until the injury he sustained on June
16, 1997[,] with Ameritemps. [His left
foot injury] on June 16, 1997, with the
subsequent four surgeries and 4% whole
person permanent impairment, proved to
be the proverbial straw that broke the
camel's back. [Albert] never returned to
work after the June 16, 1997 industrial

accident, and thereafter by consensus remained permanently and totally disabled.
[*P5] Based upon these findings, the [**4] applicable statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp.
2005), and the odd-lot doctrine, see, e.g., Peck v. Eimco
Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 574-75 (Utah 1987);
Zupon v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963-64
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), the ALJ concluded that Albert
was permanently totally disabled and that the June 16,
1997 industrial accident, which occurred while Albert
was employed by Ameritemps, "directly caused his
permanent total disability." Accordingly, the ALJ entered
an award of permanent total disability compensation
benefits in favor of Albert and against Petitioners.
[*P6] On August 21, 2003, Petitioners filed a motion for review with the Board. On May 2, 2004, the
Board issued an order denying Petitioners' motion, affirming and adopting the ALJ's factual findings, and affirming the ALJ's decision as it applied to Petitioners.
Petitioners now seek judicial review of that order.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P7] Petitioners argue that this court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's
order. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction presents
a question [**5] of law, which we review for correctness. See Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, P8,
31 P.3d 1147.
[*P8] Petitioners also argue that there is evidence
in the record that precludes an award of permanent total
disability compensation benefits to Albert and, as such,
the Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this
case. When reviewing the Board's decision, we will disturb its factual findings only if they are "not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46bI6(4)(g) (2004). Further, "when an agency has discretion
to apply its factual findings to the law, we will not disturb the agency's application unless its determination
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."
Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (quotations and citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
[*P9] Before arguing their challenge to the Board's
substantive decision, Petitioners argue that there has
been no final agency action creating subject matter jurisdiction in this court because the ALJ and the Board did
not complete the two-step [**6] process set forth under
the Workers' Compensation Act for establishing permanent total disability. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413
(Supp. 2005). In response, the Commission, Albert,
American Asbestos Abatement, and Workers' Compensation Fund (collectively, Respondents) assert that Peti-
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tioners failed to preserve this issue for appeal and waived
any argument that Albert is not permanently totally disabled. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Preservation and Waiver
[*P10| Petitioners concede that they did not raise
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction prior to their brief
with this court. Notwithstanding that admission, we may
consider it: "Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time because such issues determine whether a court has authority to address the merits'of a particular case." Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002
UT 28, PI I, 44 P.3d 724. In addition, because subject
matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to this court's power
to consider the substantive issues, the requirement that
the court have proper jurisdiction over the subject of the
dispute cannot be waived. See, e.g., [**7] Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P34, 100 P.3d)l77; Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993). Issues relating
to subject matter jurisdiction are threshold questions that
should be addressed before resolving other claims. See
Snyder, 2002 UT 28 at PI I. Because we conclude that
Petitioners' challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is
properly before us, we consider it before addressing their
challenge to the Board's substantive decision.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[*P11] The Utah Administrative Procedures Act
grants jurisdiction to the appellate courts over "final
agency actions." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-I4(I), (3)(a)
(2004). Thus, the first issue for consideration is whether
the Board's decision finding Albert permanently totally
disabled is a "final agency action," id., over which this
court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. To answer
that question, we must examine the specific statutory
provisions involved.
[*P12] The procedure for establishing permanent
total disability is set forth in the Workers' Compensation
Act. See id. § 34A-2-4I3. Under that statutory [**8]
scheme, the injured employee must first meet his or her
burden of establishing permanent total disability and
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. ^
34A-2-4l3(i)(h). The Commission must then consider
the evidence to determine whether the employee is permanently totally disabled and unable to perform reasonably available work. See id. £ 34A-2-413(1 )(c). Before
disability benefits can be awarded, however, the Commission must follow a two-step process outlined in section 34A-2-4I3. See id. £ 34A-2-413(6). The Utah Supreme Court explained the procedure for awarding such
benefits in Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004
UT 12, 84 P.3d 120 L stating

Section 34A-2-413(6) outlines the process
an administrative law judge must follow
when determining whether an injured employee is entitled to permanent total disability compensation. This section requires that a finding be issued in two
parts—an initial finding and a final finding. The initial finding of permanent total
disability triggers a review period in
which the employer or its insurance carrier may submit a reemployment plan.
[See Utah Code Ann.]
34A-2413(6)(a)(ii) [**9] , (d). This subsection
specifically states that the initial "finding
by the Commission of permanent total
disability is not final, unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties, until" the employer has the opportunity to submit a reemployment plan, the administrative law
judge reviews this reemployment plan and
the reemployment activities undertaken
pursuant to statute, and the administrative
law judge holds a hearing. Id. § 34A-2413(6)(a). The intent of the reemployment
plan is to determine whether the injured
employee can be rehabilitated in order to
reenter the workforce, and a final finding
of permanent total disability is held in reserve until the possibilities of reemployment are either exhausted or abandoned.
Only after all of these requirements have
been met does the finding of permanent
total disability become final.

Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P21. The Board's decision in this
case was issued after the initial determination of total
permanent disability, but before any opportunity for Petitioners to submit a reemployment plan. Thus, by the express terms of the Workers' Compensation Act, the "finding by the [Board] of permanent total disability is not
[**10] final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties,
until" after the employer is given an opportunity to submit a reemployment plan. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-24l3(6)(a).
[*P13] Respondents argue that the parties agreed
that the initial determination of the Board was final as a
result of a colloquy between the ALJ and counsel for
Ameritemps. When the ALJ asked whether Ameritemps was challenging that Albert was permanently
totally disabled, counsel for Ameritemps responded: "I
don't have any proof to the contrary. I'm not here to submit proof on that issue." We agree with the ALJ's determination that Ameritemps conceded that Albert was
permanently totally disabled for purposes of the initial
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finding of disability and causation. There is nothing in
the discussion between the ALJ and counsel for Ameritemps, however, that supports a finding that Ameritemps intended to waive its right to submit a reemployment plan if the industrial accident that occurred while
Albert was employed by Ameritemps was found to be
the direct cause of Albert's permanent total disability.
Thus, if this court has subject matter jurisdiction, it must
be based on a conclusion that the | * * 1 1 | initial determination of permanent total disability is a final agency action.
|*P14) From a cursory reading of the Workers'
Compensation Act's pronouncement that the initial determination is not final, it might appear that this court
need inquire no further to conclude that the Board's order
at issue is not a "final agency action," id. £
63-46b14(1), (3)(a), and that this court is without subject matter
jurisdiction. The analysis of the Utah Supreme Court in
Thomas, however, requires that we consider both
whether the initial determination by the Board is a "final
order" of that agency, and separately, whether it is a "final agency action." See 2004 UT 12 at PI4. Although the
terms are similar, they are different in their effect on this
court's jurisdiction.
[*P15] In Thomas, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether an initial determination of permanent
total disability under section 34A-2-4/3 was a "'final
order'" of the Commission for which an abstract of
judgment could be issued allowing the employee to enforce the temporary disability award in district court. Id.
at PI I. After reviewing the language of section 34A-2413, the Thomas |**12] court concluded that "because
initial findings are not final orders, subsistence payment
orders predicated upon initial findings are also not final
orders." Id. at P25. In the absence of a final order from
the Commission, no abstract was available. See Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-212(1)(a) (2001) ("An abstract of
any final order providing an award may be filed . . . in
the office of the clerk of the district court of any county
in the state.").
[*P16] In reaching its conclusion, the Thomas
court distinguished between a "'final order'" of an agency
that could support an abstract of judgment and a '"final
agency action'" that can confer subject matter jurisdiction
on the appellate courts. Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI4.

Although the Utah Administrative Procedures Act grants jurisdiction to the appellate courts over "final agency actions." it
"does not specifically define" this term.
Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 970
P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998). Since this act

does not provide a definition, we developed the Union Pacific test to determine
when administrative orders constitute "final agency actions" [**13| in order to
invoke appellate jurisdiction. [See Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
2000 UT 40, PI6, 999 P.2d 17]. Unlike
the term "final agency action," the term
"final order" is defined in the Workers'
Compensation Act. Because this act
clearly defines "final order," we need not
turn to Union Pacific for guidance on
what constitutes a "final order" for which
an abstract may issue. Thus, what constitutes a final order for puiposes of appellate review is different than what constitutes a final order for puiposes of the issuance of an abstract of an administrative
award.

Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI4. The Thomas court then
determined that an initial finding of permanent total disability was not a "final order" as defined by the Workers'
Compensation Act. See id. at P25. But, the Thomas court
did not consider whether an initial decision of the Commission finding permanent total disability is a "final
agency action" that can confer subject matter jurisdiction
on an appellate court for puiposes of judicial review. It
merely indicated that the analysis of that question should
be performed using the test announced [**14] in Union
Pacific. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI5.
[*P17] The recent per curiam decision from a divided panel of this court in Target Trucking v. Labor
Commission, 2005 UT App 70, 108 P.3d 128 (mem.) (per
curiam), may have confused these two concepts. In Target Trucking, we dismissed an appeal of a preliminary
determination of permanent total disability for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the statutory language. See id. at P6\ see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-24l3(6)(a) ("A finding by the Commission of permanent
total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by
the parties . . . ."). In doing so, this court made no distinction between a "final order" and a "final agency action," and did not apply the Union Pacific three-part test
to determine whether we should exercise appellate jurisdiction. See Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. In considering the issue now before this court, we apply that test to
answer the initial question concerning this court's subject
matter jurisdiction. "Although the Union Pacific test does
not apply to determining what constitutes [**15] a 'final
order' for which an abstract may issue under the Workers' Compensation Act, Union Pacific continues to be the
standard by which 'final administrative action' will be
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Because of the nature of agency proceedings, final actions often take place seriatim, disposing [**17] completely of discrete issues in one order while leaving
other issues for later orders. Such orders
will be final as to any issue fully decided
by that order and appealable any time
from the date of that order to the last day
to appeal the last final agency action in
the case.

judged for the purpose of judicial review." Thomas, 2004
'UT 12 at PI5.
|*P18| In Union Pacific, the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the following three-part test to determine
whether an agency action is final:

(1) Has administrative decision making
reached a stage where judicial review will
not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?;
(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal consequences flow
from the agency action?; and
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in
part, not preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency action?

Barker v. Utah Pub. Sei'v. Comm'n, 970 P.2d 702, 706
(Utah 1998). Although issues remained unresolved concerning the possibility of reemployment, the question of
whether Albert was permanently totally disabled was
disposed of completely by the Board. Thus, "judicial
review would not . . . interfere[] with the [Boardj's proceedings, since the [Board] had already refused to reconsider its prior order[]." Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI9.
n2 The Utah Supreme Court has indicated
that "although omission of this language is not
dispositive for our purposes on the question of
whether an agency order is final, it certainly signals . . . that the [agency] believes it is." Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000
UT40, PI9/1.6, 999 P.2d 17.

Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. Agency actions that
meet the foregoing test are appealable from the date of
the order's issuance. See id.
|*P19| Examining the Board's order under the
three-part test set forth in Union Pacific, we conclude
that the order is a final agency action.
A. Orderly Process of Adjudication
|*P20] This matter comes [**16] to this court after
the Board's denial of Petitioners' motion for review of the
ALJ's decision. "By denying reconsideration of its earlier
findings and conclusions, the [Board] reached the end of
its decision making process" on the issue of permanent
total disability. Id. at PI9. The Board's order denying
Petitioners' motion for review includes a "Notice of Appeal Rights" section, which provides that a party may
either (1) within twenty days of the date of the order,
request that the Board reconsider the order, or (2) within
thirty days of the date of the order, petition this court for
judicial review of the order. A request for reconsideration was filed by a party that was involved in the proceedings before the Commission, but is not a party to this
appeal. In the Board's order denying that request for reconsideration, the "Notice of Appeal Rights" section
identified an appeal to this court as the only review
available. n2 When the Board denied the request for reconsideration, that marked the end of its decision making
process concerning the issue of permanent total disability.

[**18]
B. Rights or Obligations Determined
[*P21] In the decision from which Petitioners appeal, the Board determined that Albert is permanently
totally disabled and also awarded permanent total disability compensation payments to Albert to start immediately. Consequently, the second part of the Union Pacific test is met. See Barker, 970 P. 2d at 706 (determining that agency action was final where "the language of
the order makes clear that the [agency] determined obligations of the parties with which the parties must immediately comply"); see also Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at
P20 (concluding that the second prong of the three-part
test was met where taxpayer's tax obligations were determined).
C. Preliminary, Preparatory, Procedural, or Intermediate
[*P22] The third step in determining whether
agency action is final for purposes of appeal is an analysis of whether that action is, "in whole or in part, not
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate."
Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. The Utah Supreme
Court has provided examples of the types of proceedings

Page 6
2005 UT App 491, *; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 469, **

that are not final under this last prong of the Union Pacific |**19| analysis.

The Utah cases on finality found no final
order in the following circumstances: (1)
a remand for further proceedings, Sloan v.
Board of Review, 781 P. 2d 463, 464
(Utah Ct. App. 1989): (2) an order converting informal proceedings into formal
ones, Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v.
Department of Commerce, 902 P.2d 151,
153 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); and (3) a denial
of a motion to dismiss, Barney v. Division
of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 828 P. 2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). These cases do not involve actions
in the nature of a seriatim final order; they
all involve preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate decisions.

Barker, 970 P.2d at 706; see also Union Pac, 2000 UT
40atP21.
[*P23] Although the Board's order leaves unresolved the issue of reemployment, it decides permanent
total disability with finality. The order ended the decision
making process at the agency level on this issue. Thus,
the initial determination of permanent total disability was
in the nature of a seriatim final order that was immediately appealable despite the fact that the |**20] agency
still was required to conduct the second part of the section 34A-2-413 analysis to determine whether Albert can
be rehabilitated. n3 To the extent our decision in Target
Trucking v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 70, 108
P.3d 128 (mem.) (per curiam), holds otherwise, we disavow it and instead follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court in Thomas v. Color Country Management,
2004 UT 12, 84 P. 3d 1201, to consider the issues of finality for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under the
Union Pacific test, see 2000 UT 40 at PI6.

n3 This second step can be avoided if the
parties agree that the finding of permanent total
disability is final, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413(6)(u), or if the ALJ is provided with notice
that the employer or its insurance carrier will not
submit a reemployment plan. See id. $ 34A-24l3(6)(a)(ii)(B).
|*P24] This conclusion that the initial determination of permanent total disability [**21] is not a final
order of the agency, but is a final agency action, also

reconciles the statutory language with the applicable
regulations. Section 34A-2-413(6)(a) expressly states that
the initial determination is not final and, based on that
language, the Utah Supreme Court held in Thomas that
the initial determination is not a "final order" of the
agency. See 2004 UT 12 at P25. In contrast, the Commission's regulations state that "[a] preliminary determination of permanent total disability by the Labor Commissioner or [the] Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate judicial review." Utah Admin. Code
R612-l-10(C)(l)(c).
[*P25] Because the concepts of "final order" and
"final agency action" are defined differently, the statute
and the regulation can be reconciled. n4 An initial determination of permanent total disability is not a final
order of the agency and, therefore, an abstract of judgment cannot be issued to enforce a permanent total disability compensation award based on that preliminary
finding. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P25. In contrast, the
preliminary determination of pemianent total disability
does conclude the [**22] agency decision making on the
initial question of whether Albert is permanently totally
disabled. Thus, it is a seriatim final agency action, and
this court does have subject matter jurisdiction to review
it.

n4 In Target Trucking v. Labor Commission,
2005 UT App 70, P6, 108 P3d 128 (mem.) (per
curiam), this court concluded, without applying
the Union Pacific test for finality, that the administrative rule was in conflict with the express
statutory provisions. Because we hold that a preliminary determination of permanent total disability is a final agency action, but not a final order
of the agency, we now harmonize the rule and the
statute.
III. Substantive Review of Board's Order
[*P26] Having concluded that we have subject
matter jurisdiction to review the Board's order, we now
turn to Petitioners' substantive challenge to that order.
Petitioners argue that there is evidence in the record that
precludes an award of permanent total disability compensation benefits to Albert and, [**23] therefore, the
Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this case.
We disagree.
[*P27| To advance their argument that there is evidence in the record that precludes an award of permanent
total disability compensation benefits, Petitioners selectively recite the portions of the record evidence that support their position. Based on that selective recitation of
the facts presented to the agency, Petitioners assert that
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the Board should have reached a different conclusion.
This argument amounts to an indirect challenge to the
Board's factual findings concerning the June 16, 1997
industrial accident, and is an attempt by Petitioners to
reargue the weight of the evidence in favor of their position, which is a futile tactic on appeal. See Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178
(Utah 1993) ("When reviewing an agency's decision, [we
do] not . . . reweigh the evidence."). Further, we will not
disturb the board's findings simply because another conclusion can be drawn from the evidence in the record.
See Whiteav v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah
Ct. App. I(MJ8) (stating that "findings will 'not be overturned | w *24| if based on substantial evidence, even if
another conc]usion from the evidence is permissible'"
(citation omitted)). Because Petitioners do not directly
challenge a^y of the Board's factual findings concerning
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, we assume that
they are supported by the record and do not disturb them.
n5 See Heb^r City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312
(Utah 1997) ("When a party fails to challenge a factual
linding and marshal the evidence in support of that finding, we 'assume[] that the record supports the finding[] . .
. .'" (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)).

n5 Even if Petitioners had directly challenged the Board's factual findings concerning
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, that challenge would have failed because Petitioners
failed to marshal the evidence in support of those
findings in their opening brief. See Campbell v.
Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) ("When a party fails to marshal the
evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, we
reject the challenge as nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case before [the appellate]
cour M
l. (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)). Moreover, after this failure was
noted by Respondents in their briefs, Petitioners
attempted to undertake the marshaling burden in
their reply brief and, after doing so, admitted that
Atav*^ was evidence u? the record that "coidd support'* the Board's findings. Our review of the record indicates that the Board's findings are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
u nt
S of the whole record." Utah Code Ann. § 6346b'16(4)(g) (2004).
[**251
[*P28] Petitioners also argue that the Board misapplied the lav to the facts of this case. More specifically,
Petitioners qrgue that had the Board made different factual findings based upon the aforementioned evidence
that supports their position, it would have reached a dif-

ferent legal conclusion. Given that we have already rejected Petitioners' arguments concerning the Board's factual findings, we must determine whether the Board's
application of the law to those undisturbed findings "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."
Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (quotations and citation omitted).
[*P29] In relevant part, the statute governing permanent total disability compensation benefits provides:

(b) To establish entitlement to permanent
total disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by
a preponderance of evidence that:

(i) the employee sustained
a significant impairment or
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives
rise to the permanent total
disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally [**26] disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident
or occupational disease
was the direct cause of the
employee's permanent total
disability.

Utah Cade Ann. §

34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)-(iii).

[*P30] The Board made findings relevant to each
of these elements. With respect to the first element, the
ALJ found 116 that "the preponderance of the evidence in
this case established that [Alberts industrial accident
with Anieritemps on June 16, 1997[,] caused him a 4%
whole person impairment due to his left foot injury." The
ALJ alsq found that the preponderance of the evidence
revealed that the injury Albert suffered as a result of the
June 16, 1997 industrial accident, "with the subsequent
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the
camel's toack." Concerning the second element, the ALJ
found th^t Albert "never returned to work after the June
16, 1997 industrial accident, and thereafter by consensus
remained permanently and totally disabled." Finally, as
to the third element, the ALJ found that "the preponder-
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ance of the evidence in this case established that [Albert's industrial accident [**27| of June 16, 1997[,]
acted as the direct cause of his permanent total disability."

n6 In its order, the Board "affirmed and
adopted [the ALJ]'s findings of fact."
[*P31| Based upon these undisturbed findings, the
Board concluded that Albert was permanently totally
disabled and that the June 16, 1997 industrial accident,
which occurred while Albert was employed by Ameritemps, "was the direct cause of his permanent total disability." Accordingly, the Board entered an award of
permanent total disability compensation benefits in favor
of Albert and against Petitioners. Given that the Board
made the appropriate findings to support its conclusion
under the statute, we cannot say that its conclusion "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Mity

Lite, 939 P.2d at 686 (quotations and citation omitted).
Therefore, we affirm the Board's order denying Petitioners' motion for review of the ALJ's decision.
CONCLUSION
|*P32] The Board's preliminary determination of
permanent total [**28] disability is a seriatim final
agency action, and this court does have subject matter
jurisdiction to review it. After reviewing the Board's order, we conclude that its factual findings were based
upon substantial evidence and that its application of the
law to those findings did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Therefore, we affirm.
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
[*P33| WE CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

